


Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

The UN and NATO in Bosnia:
Center Of Gravity analysis can bring clarity and focus to multinational peace operations.

By:


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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED



A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War college in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.
Faculty advisor: Col. Burt Quist, USMC

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
those of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.


20 May 1996

19960813 143

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): The UN & NATO in Bosnia: Center of Gravity Analysis Can Bring Clarity and Focus to Multinational Peace Operations (U)			
9. Personal Authors: CAPT Frank B. Guest, USN			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 14 June 1996	
12. Page Count: 33			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: UN, NATO, Bosnia, Center of Gravity, Clarity, Focus, Multi-national, Peace Operations			
15. Abstract: This paper uses the current conflict in Bosnia to illustrate the importance of using the Center of Gravity concept in Multi-national peace operations. It argues the concept can be used to explain the inability of the UN & NATO leaders to agree on a course of action to resolve the conflict. The paper includes a brief history, discussion of UN policy arms, identification of strategic and operational centers of gravity for the UN and Bosnian Serbs and finally shows how, in terms of a Center of Gravity Cycle, the two were off track but then came together.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841- 664 644		20. Office Symbol: C	

THESIS STATEMENT

The conflict in Bosnia is a good illustration of the importance of the concept of Center of Gravity (COG) in peace operations. Whether the concept was consciously applied in Bosnia or not, it can be used to help explain the differences between the UN and NATO regarding the best course of action for conflict resolution. The UN and NATO could not complete their mission in Bosnia until there was a clear understanding by both of the true COG on which they needed to focus. The UN and NATO experience in Bosnia, until mid 1995, highlights the utility of a disciplined use of the concept in achieving a focused consensus among disparate national or alliance agenda or interests while conducting multinational peace operations.

ABSTRACT

This paper uses the current conflict in Bosnia, through mid 1995, to illustrate the importance of a disciplined use of the concept of Center of Gravity (COG) in multinational peace operations. It argues that the concept, independent of whether or not it was consciously applied by UN and NATO leaders, can be used to explain their inability to arrive at anything resembling an agreed course of action for mission accomplishment until the middle of 1995. The paper progresses logically through a discussion of history, UN policy aims, strategic and operational centers of gravity and related critical factors, to show the UN and NATO could not successfully resolve the conflict sooner because they were pursuing different Centers of Gravity. The discussion shows that the conflict evolved significantly from its beginning when UNPROFOR was created in 1991. The approach to resolution adopted by the UN military leadership, however, did not evolve in spite of increased latitude contained in subsequent Security Council resolutions. NATO on the other hand, entered the conflict in 1993 and saw a much different situation and soon preferred actions aimed at a different COG. Finally, the paper shows that had a COG analysis been done, the UN and NATO would have had a clear view of their differences and the impact of them. Instead, the conflict evolved for two additional years. When tentative COG and course of action consensus was achieved, it did contribute to mission accomplishment and progress toward the Dayton peace accord.

The conclusion does not offer COG analysis as a panacea to the reality of conflicting national or alliance interests and the difficulty in achieving consensus. It does strongly suggest that the results of a disciplined application to the concept of center of gravity analysis can point the way to successful courses of action and should be an essential arrow in the quiver political leaders who must ultimately forge multi-national consensus. The concept should be applied through out an evolving conflict. In Bosnia it remains a valid methodology to point the way toward future modifications to IFOR activities if required.

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INTRODUCTION

*The great majority of US peace operations will be part of a UN operation. National interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency. Consensus is painstakingly difficult and solutions are often national in character. Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities which at times complicate the multinational effort!*¹
FM100-23

The problem highlighted by the above statement, though discussed in the limited context of some nations' demonstrated desires to retain ultimate OPCON of forces assigned to multinational operations, can be easily applied on a broader scale in more complex scenarios. The conflict in Bosnia is a good example. In the Bosnian drama, the United Nations by virtue of its position as the only truly world body, is cast as the dominant member of an alliance of alliances. No less than three world influencing bodies (the UN, NATO and WEU) are attempting to contain conflict and facilitate peaceful resolution among the variously warring factions. Each alliance's and each participating nation's situation is complicated, far beyond the comparatively simple problem mentioned above, by common membership among the alliances, with each nation having different interests and different degrees of influence within each alliance. The situation cries out for a logical 'ground truth' methodology to focus participants on possible actions, clarify areas of difference and provide a solid basis to estimate the likelihood of success of each.

This paper demonstrates that the concept of Center of Gravity (COG), as a disciplined thought process or methodology, can be a valuable tool in transcending national interests and doctrine and can point the way to those military courses of action with the greatest potential to achieve the desired aim. Actual adoption of a particular course of action will remain an individual national or alliance decision, but the COG concept makes the decision clearer and shows the impact on stated aims in a focused way. More specifically, the paper will review the UN stated

aims in Bosnia, the actions of the UN and NATO in the conflict and then, by actually applying the COG concept, will show that COG can be useful in explaining that the UN and NATO could not accomplish the mission or make progress in resolving the conflict until there was consensus on the true center of gravity which had to be defeated.

BOSNIA BACKGROUND

*As I observed the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and the turmoil that was sure to continue in other Balkan states, I was reminded of a line from Shakespeare's 'Life and death of King John': "So foul a sky clears not without a storm."*²

Robert D. Kaplan

Some historical perspective is essential to discussion of any complex issue. So it is with Bosnia. As the final stage in the collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on the 3rd of March 1992. That action had been shortly preceded by similar actions taken by the new states of Slovenia and Croatia. On the 22nd of May 1992, the United Nations General Assembly adopted consecutive resolutions, concurring in previous recommendations from the Security Council, and admitted the three former Yugoslav republics to membership as independent states in the United Nations.

The modern history of Bosnia-Herzegovina began with the 1878 Berlin Treaty which was the beginning of the end of over 400 years of Ottoman rule. The years from 1878 to present were tumultuous and punctuated with no less than three Balkan Wars, two World Wars and the present conflict. Approximately 45 years of forced calm under totalitarian communist rule only suppressed the still smoldering and long standing religious and ethnic disputes. During that time, however, Bosnia regained its geographic integrity as one of six separate republics of the Yugoslav Federation under Marshall Tito. In 1974, a new constitution was approved that included recognition of Bosnia as a Moslem nation within the Yugoslav Federation. The borders of

Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other republics were the same as those drawn at Berlin. For Bosnia, they were the same as in the 14th century.

In 1991 the break up of the Yugoslav Federation accelerated. Slovenia declared its independence on the 25th of June and armed border conflict ensued with Serbia (rump Yugoslavia). On the 28th of June the European Community (EC), believing the crisis to be a European problem to solve, sent a delegation to Belgrade to negotiate for peace. After several failed cease fire attempts and an EC freeze on weapons sales to Serbia, the Federal Army withdrew from Slovenia.

Croatia also declared its independence on the 25th of June. However, its belated decision to join Slovenia in fighting the Serbs caused it to both lose Slovenian trust and suffer significant casualties in a separate conflict. The Serbian weighted Yugoslav Federal Army had collected heavy weapons and ammunition from the other republics earlier in 1991 and was well equipped to fight against secession of industrialized Croatia. On the 23rd of December Germany officially recognized both Slovenia and Croatia as independent nations. The UN brokered a Serb and Croatian cease fire that went into effect on the 3rd of January 1992. On the 15th most EC nations followed the lead of Germany and officially recognized Slovenia and Croatia. The UN cease fire, however, left significant portions of Croatia occupied by secessionist Serb forces (Krajina Serbs). In mid 1995, the Croatian army reestablished control over all but the eastern most portion.

The bid for independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina was also "officially" successful, but it began later and turned out to be much more difficult. A Yugoslav peace conference had been established by the EC in the fall of 1991 to deal with the developing conflicts. In January 1992, after the cease fires between Serbia and Slovenia and Serbia and Croatia had gone into effect, Bosnia made application to the conference. The move also foreclosed on any attempt by other

regional powers to act on rumors that the area would be divided into three parts.³ The EC Conferences' Arbitration Committee recommended a Bosnian referendum as a prerequisite to recognition. The referendum occurred in February and saw the Croats and Muslims vote together in favor of independence. In March 1992 the EC convened a special conference devoted exclusively to the issue of independence for Bosnia. At the conference the Serbs agreed to the historical borders for Bosnia and asked in return for the establishment of special administrative organizations in the areas where Serbs were in the majority.

In April 1992 the EC countries, the United States and other countries recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. UN admission followed on 22 May coincident with that of Slovenia and Croatia. Serbia, however, opposed the recognition and moved militarily with their own forces, local militia and Federal Army units to capture Sarajevo and establish corridors to the major Serbian enclaves. Croatia also attacked at Mostar and its surrounding territory in central Bosnia. The brutal conflict with Serbia and rebel Serb forces has continued to the present, but the conflict with Croatia actually evolved into a strained alliance of necessity.

In the interim there has been three serious attempts at peace. The Vance-Owen peace plan and the Contact Group peace plan helped pave the way for the Dayton plan. The later two plans, in particular, have much in common. It can be argued that the success of the Dayton plan is due more to the increased activity of the United States, coupled with changes in the military situation, rather than to major new ideas.

THE UN AND NATO - STRATEGIC AIMS

*In Bosnia, there was not even agreement on what might constitute 'combat situations', let alone a unified command plan, clear rules of engagement, or a joint understanding on the use of air power.*⁴

Rosemary Righter

In the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Accord, the Balkan conflict may finally be on the road to resolution. However, comments such as the pessimistic statement above are representative of wide spread frustration that the UN and NATO were unable to resolve the conflict sooner. It is not at all clear, though, that the pessimism in this and other statements like "it is doubtful whether NATO will consider another operational partnership with the UN"⁵ are yet foregone conclusions. With the benefit of hindsight, looking at the UN and NATO in Bosnia in the context of the concept of Center of Gravity (COG), as it has evolved in the US military, may help us do better next time. Specifically, the problem of losing focus on the opposing COG and selection of inappropriate courses of action can be clearly seen. A necessary first step is to show the evolution of the overall UN strategic or policy aims.

The need for an overall strategic policy aim, and its relation to the COG concept, should be self-evident. It extends from the Clausewitzian premise the "The political objective - the original motive for war - will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."⁶ Stated another way in contemporary writings, "Strategic and operational centers of gravity do not exist in isolation from the national and military strategic aims."⁷ So a pre-requisite to COG analysis is finding the political or strategic aim. In their insightful article 'Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity' Colonels Mendel and Tooke say "The strategic level is dominant in the continuum of war because it is at this level that the political, economic, military and other aims and objectives are defined and thus the importance of planning from the top down."⁸ Having established the aim, military leaders can analyze the situation and make recommendations as to the operational steps, or courses of action, that should be taken to accomplish it. A hindsight analysis will identify actual centers of gravity and other critical factors and will show that the wrong COG was being pursued until the summer of 1995.

To begin the process, we need only agree that the Balkan conflict is indeed an armed military conflict (a war) with the Bosnian Serbs a principal opposing force; and that the UN is involved and has an identifiable policy or strategic aim. The former is self-evident and a discussion of the later follows.

The UN became politically involved in the Balkans in 1991 and militarily involved in 1992. The initial diplomatic efforts were carried out by UN representative Mr. Cyrus Vance with limited aims. Efforts were focused on stopping the fighting between Croatia and Serbia. UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713 and 721 of September and November respectively, imposed a weapons embargo and encouraged the parties to adhere to the UN/EC brokered Geneva agreement of 23 November 1991. Only the *possibility* of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was mentioned. NATO's initial involvement began in 1992 with maritime forces aiding in sanction and embargo enforcement. In 1993 NATO land and sea based air forces began enforcement of a No Fly Zone that was later extended to cover both Bosnia and Croatia; and to include close air support (CAS). The roles of UNPROFOR (with NATO CAS support) also expanded to include protecting humanitarian efforts, protecting safe areas, overseeing (or controlling) heavy weapons storage and selected border control. These tasks are best defined as missions or operational aims.

A subsequent stream of almost 90 additional UNSCRs from 1992 - 1995, coupled with almost as many statements from the President of the General Assembly, were the implementing directives so to speak of these expanded tasks and are also the basis for the evolved strategic aims of UNPROFOR. Appendix A contains a summary of key UNSCRs.

The UNSCRs reveal an intangible but none-the-less identifiable strategic policy aim. It was, initially, to establish a climate "for the purposes of establishing peace and security in the

region.”⁹ This phrase, or others similar to it, reappear numerous times and is not unlike an earlier well known policy aim “to make the world safe for democracy.” Similar words also appeared in UNSCRs supporting UN operations in Iraq and Haiti. Those operations also included the restoration of legitimate governments as part of their aim. There was already a recognized government in Bosnia. Indeed, the aim in all these examples is fundamental to the UN Charter.

As the conflict developed, the UNSCRs actually deployed the UNPROFOR and gradually increased its mandate and tasks beyond simple peace monitoring in Croatia to a range of difficult tasks in Bosnia as well. As there was no peace in Bosnia, humanitarian relief rather than peace monitoring was the initial impetus for entry into Bosnia. The strategic aim remained peace in the region, but as the conflict evolved, a humanitarian and atrocities related corollary to the overall aim appeared. By the fall of 1993 when NATO was fully engaged, the UN’s strategic aim had evolved. It included not only peace and security for Croatia but for the entire region including Bosnia with the added corollary of humanitarian relief for all non-combatants and the cessation of atrocities, most notably ethnic cleansing. The aim was to be accomplished through the use of diplomacy, sanctions and the UNPROFOR - a peacekeeping force - protected by NATO.¹⁰

Beyond this complex but straight forward policy aim, there were inconsistencies. One was that the prerequisite peacekeeping “conditions” (a negotiated peace in effect and the consent of all parties) were technically satisfied prior to the UNPROFOR deployment to Croatia but were never satisfied for entry into Bosnia. Another is the possibility that the expanded mandate and tasks for UNPROFOR exceeded what a lightly armed peacekeeping force under the UN Charter could be expected to accomplish. At both the strategic and operational level, however, the aim remained achievable. That is, the Security Council addressed the apparent inconsistency, either consciously or unconsciously, by evoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter and by using the diplomatically

magic words "all necessary means" which first appeared in UNSCR 770 of 13 August 1992 and later in UNSCRs 816 and 838 in March and June of 1993 respectively. These are the same words used in resolutions authorizing the Gulf War, two years earlier, and the more recent operation in Haiti. The apparent difference being the will to use them as reflected in each operations' execution. With NATO air power complimenting the lightly armed peacekeeping force, and both empowered with "all necessary means", if military strength were needed it was available.

It follows that any failure to achieve the aim earlier was not due to an ill conceived or intangible aim or the lack of adequate means to achieve it. Rather it was mainly a failure of key diplomatic and military UN personnel to allow their thinking to evolve with the conflict and to develop an appropriate strategy. Annex B lists selected key personnel involved in the conflict.

Regarding NATO, it was not the task of the North Atlantic Council, SACEUR or other NATO commands to establish strategic policy aims. Theirs was to develop and execute successful operations to support UNPROFOR mission execution. NATO's response took the form of two major operations made available as tools for the UN and the UNPROFOR. The operations evolved into what became known as Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard.

Operation Sharp Guard. This was the final evolution of the successful NATO led multinational maritime effort (with the WEU) to enforce UN sanctions and embargo at sea. The strategic objective could be defined as: to limit hostilities by enforcing the weapons embargo (UNSCR 713) and, through sanction enforcement (UNSCR 757/819/820), to pressure the Serb regime in Belgrade to stop interfering in Bosnia and stop supporting the Bosnian Serbs.

Operation Deny Flight. This was the NATO led multinational air effort to enforce the UN no fly zone over Bosnia (UNSCR 781/816/836), and later Croatia as well (UNSCR 908/958). Its strategic objective could be defined as: to limit hostilities by preventing fixed and rotary wing air

attacks. To some degree it was successful in this effort. The UN, in the just mentioned UNSCRs, increased the authority to use NATO combat aircraft to include CAS for protecting UNPROFOR, protecting humanitarian efforts and protecting safe areas. In the later efforts it was largely not successful until August/September 1995. The reason was not lack of capability but lack of use. In August 1995, with a different "dual key" agreement with the UN and a new UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander with a different view of use of force, NATO began operation Deliberate Force. The operation focused on the Bosnian COG and had important strategic and operational impact. It strongly reinforced the separate peace efforts that later produced the Dayton Accord.

CENTER OF GRAVITY APPLIED

*The first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.*¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz

The over arching problem in Bosnia is the reality, in multinational efforts, of conflicting alliance or national interests, influence and doctrine - especially when military action is involved. One way to get around this morass, or to mitigate its impact, is to find a way to improve clarity and focus to facilitate consensus. The Center of Gravity concept can help. Returning to Colonels Mendel and Tooke, they say "Selecting a Center of Gravity enjoins decisive thinking and brings clarity of purpose..."¹² They go on to say "Indeed the center of gravity concept is most useful in bring focus to our planning."¹³ The analysis can be painstaking and must include identification of own and enemy critical factors. When planning in advance, it is certainly possible to get some or all of the analysis wrong due to incomplete data or a variety of other factors. The important point is that the decisive thinking occurs and a framework is available to help modify courses of action as a crisis evolves and new information is discovered.

For a definition of Center of Gravity we must begin with Clausewitz. He refers to “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”¹⁴ In contemporary writing, Lt. Col. Izzo says “The center of gravity represents a concentration of enemy strength...”¹⁵ and he goes on to say “The center of gravity is not an enemy weakness.”¹⁶ Centers of gravity can exist at both the strategic and operational levels of war. To identify the centers of gravity in Bosnia we need only apply two simple tests. We must ask “what could win for the [Bosnian Serbs]?”¹⁷ or the converse, exactly what would cause the enemy to quit?

The benefit of hindsight allows the luxury of starting first with identifying centers of gravity, compare them to the test questions and then briefly discuss critical factors. This is opposite from how a center of gravity analysis would occur in the planning process before an operation starts, but it is appropriate when looking at a completed operation. The determination that follows could have been accomplished as early as the fall of 1993. By that time, there had been at least four UNSCRs calling for “all necessary means” and chapter VII of the UN charter (the peace enforcement chapter) had been evoked on more than one occasion and sent to the Secretary General to execute.

The Bosnian Serb COG. One scholar has suggested that the strategic center of gravity was in Belgrade. Specifically, it “was Milosevic’s regime and Serbian public support.”¹⁸ The same article suggested the operational center of gravity was “Bosnian Serb forces defending the northern corridor.”¹⁹ Looking first at the strategic center of gravity, the Belgrade regime does seem to satisfy the test questions. Belgrade provided the Bosnian Serbs with supplies, training, equipment and political support for the idea of a greater Serbia. Belgrade was the principal source of sustainability for the Bosnian Serbs with the real potential to intervene directly and significantly impact the balance of power. Some have argued that Belgrade actually started the

war using the Bosnian Serbs as proxies for a land grab.²⁰ Without getting into the debate of whether the war was one of aggression or simply a civil war, it is clear that with continued support from Belgrade the Bosnian Serbs would eventually win and without it they would eventually have to stop.

There is evidence that NATO maritime and air activities in support of UN sanctions and other mandates actually did impact this strategic center of gravity. In 1994 Mr. Milosevic began distancing himself from Bosnian Serbs, ultimately negotiating for them and signing the Dayton Accord. The sanctions were having a serious effect on the Serb economy and there was some fear (in Serbia) that NATO air strikes could be targeted at Serbia if the regime did not cease supporting the violence in Bosnia.²¹ This would almost certainly erode his support at home. In addition, Milosevic was perceived in the world politic as an aggressor and expansionist. When combined with the potential for erosion of support of at home he reduced his support for Bosnia.

An operational center of gravity can be less enduring. Centers of gravity "are dynamic and often change as the conflict evolves."²² It is more true at the operational level than at the strategic. The Bosnian Serb operational center of gravity was their army (the BSA). That is clearly what would win or lose the conflict for them. At any particular point in time there were various concentrations of strength, but the army was the operational COG. Some of the concentrations were enduring. They include the northern corridor (suggested above), Banja Luka, Pale, BSA forces surrounding Sarajevo (particularly those on Mt. Igman) and possibly also the locus of disparate BSA C4I, IADS and logistic nodes. It is difficult to say with certainty, that an operational defeat of any one would result in strategic defeat. All could easily be decisive points,²³ however, where defeat of some number of them could lead to defeating the COG.

A brief discussion of critical factors will complete Bosnian Serb COG analysis. The critical strengths include the armor and artillery of the army, the IADS, logistic stockpiles and Serbian support. Key among critical weaknesses were international legitimacy, circuitous lines of communication and supply, lack of infantry, geographic choke points and tactical air support. From the UNPROFOR perspective, none of these could be termed critical vulnerabilities. Factoring in available NATO air power, however, all strengths *and* weaknesses become critically vulnerable if 'protection' was called for by UNPROFOR.

The strongest proof is in what actually happened. No single military action, no single operational defeat, resulted in the Dayton Accord. In fact, no action to address the BSA center of gravity occurred until the summer of 1995. Until that time, the UN's consistent emphasis on impartiality coupled with the pin prick effect of early air strikes served only to highlight UN/NATO vulnerabilities. When focused action on BSA vulnerabilities did occur, it was seen in a sequence of interactive diplomatic and military, and tactical and operational level actions by all participants. The result was military pressure on the BSA COG that weighted decisions in favor of the diplomatic opening created by the United States and other Contact Group nations. The sequence of events began in May with the Croatian "Operation Flash", included the NATO/UN operation "Deliberate Force" in August and September, and ended in October with intense shuttle diplomacy. The detailed sequence, in rough chronological order, is contained in Annex C.

The UN/NATO COG. In discussing *opposing* centers of gravity, the UN/NATO/WEU 'alliance' should be treated as single entity. The strategic center of gravity that seems to fall out is the Security Council itself. Clearly a strength based on increasingly evolving mandates and steadily widening latitudes given to the Secretary General and his UNPROFOR generals. Its resolutions were the basis of all NATO and WEU actions. The operational center of gravity was

the UNPROFOR on the ground. It was a clear strength based on numbers alone, but also because the mandated humanitarian and safe area protection missions could not happen without it. Both pass the "what could win test" and the "what could lose test." It can be argued that the blatant ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR in executing their mandates came very near to actually losing the conflict for the UN, had threats by key countries (Britain and France) to withdraw their troops been carried out.

Critical strengths for the UN/NATO include the Security Council, the NAC, NATO air power, NATO/WEU maritime power, C4I, UNPROFOR and the belated Rapid Reaction Force. Critical weaknesses include the Secretary General, UNPROFOR ROE, dual key C2, refugees, the civilian population, UNMOs and UNHCR agencies. These weaknesses are all also critical vulnerabilities from the Bosnian Serb perspective because they can all be attacked or exploited and lead directly to the operational COG. The UNPROFOR itself (a critical strength and center of gravity), actually became a *critical vulnerability* due to the Secretary General not using the full authorities available to execute the mandates he was given.

WHY THE UN AND NATO DIDN'T ACT EARLIER

The challenge to the UN leadership today is bridging the gap militarily... between the two chapters (sometimes called chapter VI and ½ requirements).²⁴ JFQ

There were two main reasons why the UN and NATO could not 'bridge the gap' from 1993, when they should have, until mid 1995 when they finally did. The first was the conflict with national interests of several of the principle EC countries. Susan Sontag, in her passionate article "A Lament For Bosnia" said "But the Europeans didn't want to stop the conflict (both the British Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay are traditionally pro Serb)."²⁵ The second was UN emphasis on neutrality and impartiality at all cost. Whether the second was caused by the first is debatable, but

regardless it shows that there was a gap in thinking. The Secretary General and his UN Generals were focused on protecting their own COG while NATO military leaders were focused on the COG of the principle obstruction to fulfilling the Security Council aims and missions. The crisis was still only “construed by the United Nations as falling within what it calls a ‘humanitarian’ operation.”²⁶ Also, “the expression ‘Mogadishu line’ was coined by Lieut. Gen. Sir Michael Rose of Britain, the previous United Nations commander in Sarajevo, who vigorously defended the idea that the United Nations troops had to stay within *the narrow confines of neutral peacekeeping* duties or become participants in a war.”²⁷ (emphasis added) The value of Center of Gravity analysis, in this case, is that it shows clearly focusing on own (UN) COG to the near exclusion of that of the opposition (Bosnian Serbs) was unlikely to achieve the desired aim.

In theory, decisive points mark the path most likely to succeed. They follow logically from critical vulnerabilities developed in the COG analysis. But, since the UN and NATO were each focused on a different COG they could not agree on the path until the summer of 1995. COG analysis would have focused the UN and NATO on answering the crucial question of which was the best path to success. A methodical and decisive COG analysis will not provide black and white answers but it can frame the question for military and political debate. The question from 1993 through 1995 in Bosnia was which was more important, preserving own center of gravity and protecting own vulnerabilities or, using the authorities provided to accomplish the mission while protecting own COG? The later would necessarily require pressure on the opposing Serb COG and impact the perception of neutrality. More succinctly, should the focus of effort be on protecting mission *status* (read impartiality and neutrality) or on mission *accomplishment*?

These questions strike at the heart of the debate on exactly how to ‘bridge the gap’, and explain why the UN and NATO could not agree on a course of action until UNPROFOR (the

COG) was threatened with dissolving from within. The Bosnia crisis was less threatening, and the aggression less clear, than in Korea (1950) and Iraq (1991). Equally, it was (is) significantly more threatening than that faced by the multinational force that entered Haiti (1994). All were UN operations under chapter VII of the UN Charter and all evoked "all necessary means" but the contrast in execution is stark and impossible to ignore.

UNPROFOR initially entered Bosnia with the "sole remit of ensuring that international aid was delivered to the civilian population."²⁸ From subsequent UNSCRs, however, it is clear that the Security Council intended the humanitarian mission to succeed and, supported by the North Atlantic Council, provided the tools to do what needed to be done. The path adopted by the Secretary General and his UNPROFOR generals from 1993 through mid 1995 did not get there and the path from mid 1995 onward did. Center of Gravity analysis shows why. The figure at

left represents COG analysis as integral to the process of determining appropriate courses of action to achieve a particular end. It shows how courses of action extending from protecting own COG can cause decisive points to be on a track that does not lead to the desired aim.

The correct path is more often through courses of action that attack or weaken

The Center of Gravity Cycle




Figure 1-1

the belligerent COG. Achieving this consensus among military and political leaders is essential and should occur early in crisis development and periodically thereafter.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Bosnia is a human tragedy prolonged by international political obfuscation, conflicting interests and lack of political leadership. This paper points out a simple lesson learned that, if incorporated into the planning and execution of future peace operations, can help in making them successful. That lesson is application of the Center of Gravity concept and it means the future of UN and NATO peace operations need not be bleak.

The concept of Center of Gravity is a disciplined military thought process. It is integral to the Commanders Estimate process and development of courses of action to accomplish the stated political aim. The COG concept, applied in hindsight to the experience of the UN and NATO in Bosnia, shows that it can help to clarify and explain why effective action was not taken sooner. If done in advance it can bring a degree of clarity and focus to decision making.

NATO's current peace Implementation Force role in Bosnia can benefit from use of COG analysis. It is one tool available to military planners, the results of which should be an arrow in the decision making quiver of political as well as military leaders.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Headquarters United States Army, Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations, December 1994. P.23
- ² Kaplan, Robert D., Balkan Ghosts: A journey through time, Vintage Book, Vintage departures ed. New York, St. Martins Press, 1993, p. 287.
- ³ Unpublished "Bluffer's Guide to the Former Yugoslavia" obtained from the Sixth Fleet N2 staff, p. 11. The document refers to rumors in 1990 - 1991 that the area would be divided into three parts.
- ⁴ Righter, Rosemary, "A Marriage Made in Hell", With No Peace To Keep...United Nations Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia, edited by Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski. p. 23.
- ⁵ Ibid. p. 28.
- ⁶ Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, Princeton University Press, 1976 & 1984, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 81.
- ⁷ Metz, Steven and Downey, Ltcol Fredrick M., "Centers of Gravity and Strategic Planning", Military Review, April 1988, p. 22-23.
- ⁸ Mendel, Col. William M. USA (Ret) and Tooke, Col. Lamar USA, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity", Military Review, June 1993, p. 3.
- ⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) of 23 September 1991, paragraph 6. This is the first of a number of resolutions to use this phrase, or words similar to them. It is also the first of several resolutions on Bosnia to evoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In paragraph 5 of UNSCR 743 of 21 February 1992, for example, it says that UNPROFOR is 'to create the conditions of peace and security.'
- ¹⁰ Following the end of the Croatian-Serbian conflict in January 1992, a lightly armed peacekeeping force was inserted to monitor compliance from a neutral posture. By 1993, the Security Council recognized that more heavily armed protection (NATO) was required after the UNPROFOR mandate was extended to Bosnia.
- ¹¹ Mendel, Col. William M. USA (Ret) and Tooke, Col. Lamar USA, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity", Military Review, June 1993, p. 3.
- ¹² Ibid, p. 3.
- ¹³ Ibid, p. 4.
- ¹⁴ Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, Princeton University Press, 1976 & 1984, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 595-596.
- ¹⁵ Izzo, Lt.col. Lawrence L, USA, "The Center of Gravity is not an Achilles Heel" Military Review, January 1988, p. 76.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. p. 76.
- ¹⁷ Ibid. p. 74.
- ¹⁸ Vego, Milan, "How to Win in Bosnia," The Washington Post, August 13, 1995, p. C-2.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. p. C-2.
- ²⁰ Ibid. p. C-2.
- ²¹ The Balkans, 1995, Janes Sentinel, Yugoslavia. P. 3-4.
- ²² Metz, Steven and Downey, Ltcol Fredrick M., "Centers of Gravity and Strategic Planning", Military Review, April 1988, p. 31.
- ²³ Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operation, June 1993, p. 6-7 and 6-8. This publication defines decisive points as 'often geographic in nature, such as a hill, a town or a base of operations...command post, critical boundary, or communications node. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to getting at centers of gravity.'
- ²⁴ Lewis, William H. and Sewall, John O.B., "United Nations peacekeeping: Ends versus means," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993, p. 51.
- ²⁵ Sontag, Susan, "A Lament For Bosnia", The Nation, December 25, 1995, p. 819.
- ²⁶ Darnton, John, "U.N. Buildup in Bosnia Eyes 'Mogadishu Line', New York Times, June 7, 1995, p. A18.
- ²⁷ Ibid. p. A18.
- ²⁸ The Balkans, 1995, Janes Sentinel, Yugoslavia. P. 3-4.

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13. Mendel, Col. William M. USA (Ret.) and Tooke, Col. Lamar USA, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity", Military Review, June 1993.
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 19. Sontag, Susan, "A Lament For Bosnia", The Nation, December 25, 1995.
 20. Swider, Gregory, Naval and Marine Contributions to Bosnia, A published study by Center for Naval Analysis, October 1995.
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APPENDIX A

SELECTED UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1991 - 1995

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| Resolution 713 | 25 September 1991
Fully supports the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, and decides that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. |
| Resolution 721 | 27 November 1991
Approves the efforts towards the possible establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia. |
| Resolution 724 | 15 December 1991
Establishes a committee of the Security Council to deal with the observance of the arms embargo. |
| Resolution 727 | 8 January 1992
Welcomes the signing of an Implementation Accord at Sarajevo on 2 January 1992. |
| Resolution 743 | 21 February 1992
Approves plan for establishment of UNPROFOR for the initial period of one year. |
| Resolution 752 | 15 May 1992
Demands immediate cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population. |
| Resolution 757 | 30 May 1992
Imposed mandatory sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. |
| Resolution 758 | 8 June 1992
Decides to enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR including the establishment of a Security Zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. Demands unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid supplies. |
| Resolution 761 | 29 June 1992
Authorizes deployment of additional elements of UNPROFOR for security of Sarajevo airport and delivery of humanitarian assistance. |

- Resolution 762 30 June 1992
Establishes Joint Commission under UNPROFOR and strengthens UN force in "pink zones".
- Resolution 764 13 July 1992
Authorizes deployment of additional elements to ensure security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Resolution 769 7 August 1992
Authorizes enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength to enable it to perform immigration and customs functions on the borders in Croatia.
- Resolution 770 13 August 1992
Calls upon states to take "all necessary measures" to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo, and wherever needed in Bosnia.
- Resolution 771 13 August 1992
Condemns "ethnic cleansing". Demands immediate and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and ICRC to camps, prisons and detention centers.
- Resolution 776 16 September 1992
Authorizes enlargement of UNPROFOR mandate and strength in Bosnia to protect UNHCR organized aid convoys and convoys of released detainees.
- Resolution 777 19 September 1992
Considers that Serbia and Montenegro cannot continue automatically and membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the UN, and should apply for membership.
- Resolution 779 6 October 1992
Authorizes responsibility for monitoring withdrawal of JNA from Croatia, demilitarization of Prevlaka Peninsula and the removal of heavy weapons from Croatia and Montenegro.
- Resolution 781 9 October 1992
Bans military flights over Bosnian airspace, exempting UNPROFOR and mission-supporting flights. Undertakes to examine additional measures to enforce the ban.

Resolution 795	18 December 1992 Authorizes UNPROFOR mandate in Macedonia.
Resolution 798	18 December 1992 Condemns massive organized and systematic rape of women in Bosnia and demands closure of detention camps.
Resolution 802	25 January 1993 Demands cease fire and withdrawal of Croatian Army following the 22 January Croatian Army offensive in the UN Protected Areas.
Resolution 808	22 February 1993 Decides to establish an Int'l Tribunal for prosecution of persons responsible for violation of Int'l humanitarian law.
Resolution 816	31 March 1993 Authorizes all necessary measures to police No-Fly zone extension covering flights by fixed wing and rotary aircraft in Bosnia.
Resolution 819	16 April 1993 Declares Srebrenica a Safe Area. Demands that Bosnian Serbs withdraw from surrounding area. Demands the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cease supplying Bosnian Serb Army with military equipment and services.
Resolution 820	17 April 1993 Tightens sanctions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Resolution 824	6 May 1993 Declares Bihac, Sarajevo, Zepa, Gorazde and Tuzla as Safe Areas alongside Srebrenica.
Resolution 827	25 May 1993 Establishes International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Resolution 836	4 June 1993 Calls on States to implement Safe Areas provisions. Extends UNPROFOR's mandate to enable it to take "all necessary measures", including the "use of force", to deter attacks, to monitor the cease fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary

units and to use "all necessary measures" through the use of air power in and around the Safe Areas, to support the mandate.

- Resolution 842 18 June 1993
Welcomes the offer of the US to contribute 300 additional personnel to the UNPROFOR presence in Macedonia.
- Resolution 843 18 June 1993
Confirms that the Committee established by Resolution 724 is entrusted with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the UN Charter.
- Resolution 844 18 June 1993
Authorizes reinforcement of UNPROFOR and "reaffirms its decision on use of air power" in and around the Safe Areas.
- Resolution 855 9 August 1993
Calls upon the federal Republic of Yugoslavia to reconsider its termination of the Conference Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) missions in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina.
- Resolution 859 23 August 1993
Calls for an immediate cease fire throughout Bosnia under "Chapter VII of the UN Charter". Reaffirms all previous resolutions and affirms that a solution to the conflict must be in conformance with the Charter of the UN and the principles of international law. Affirms the principles of unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force or by "ethnic cleansing". Affirms the right of all displaced persons to return to their homes and the maintenance of Sarajevo as a united city.
- Resolution 871 4 October 1993
Notes three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR, one for each of Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia. Calls for an immediate cease fire between Croat and local Serb forces under the auspices of ICIFY. "Authorizes UNPROFOR to use force to carry out its mandate and ensure its safety and freedom of movement". Decides to review urgently the extension of close air support to Croatia.
- Resolution 900 4 March 1994
Calls for cooperation with UNPROFOR for the consolidation of a cease fire in and around Sarajevo. Requests a Special Coordinator to work with Bosnian government for the restoration of public services in Sarajevo.

- Resolution 908 31 March 1994
Approves plans and authorizes resources for the reopening of Tuzla airport. Extends close air support to territory of Croatia, and increases UNPROFOR strength by 3,500 troops.
- Resolution 913 22 April 1994
Condemns Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde and demands cease fire and withdrawal of military forces from the Safe Area. Demands release of UN personnel being held by Bosnian Serbs.
- Resolution 914 27 April 1994
Increases UNPROFOR strength by 6,500 troops, 50 UNMOs and 275 CIVPOL.
- Resolution 941 23 September 1994
Condemns ethnic cleansing campaign by Bosnian Serb troops and demands UN entry into Bijeljina, Banja Luka and other areas under Bosnian Serb control. Reaffirms that declarations and actions made under duress, especially those regarding land ownership, are null and void.
- Resolution 942 23 September 1994
Imposes economic and political sanctions against Bosnian Serbs.
- Resolution 943 23 September 1994
Partially lifts trade sanctions on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with respect to certain aircraft and ferry services, as well as sporting and cultural exchanges.
- Resolution 958 19 November 1994
Extends the provisions of Resolution 836 concerning the use of air power in and around the Safe Areas to the Republic of Croatia.
- Resolution 959 19 November 1994
Demands that Krajina Serbs fully respect the international border between Croatia and Bosnia, and an end to hostilities in and around the Safe Area of Bihac. Requests intensification of efforts to reach an agreement on demilitarization and normalization of Sarajevo.

- Resolution 981 31 March 1995
Establishes UNCRO in Croatia and outlines intended mandate until 30 November 1995.
- Resolution 982 31 March 1995
Welcomes the acceptance by the Bosnian government of the Contact Group Peace Plan and the cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 31 December 1994.
- Resolution 983 31 March 1995
Establishes UNPREDEP in Macedonia as successor of UNPROFOR Macedonia Command.
- Resolution 987 19 April 1995
Condemns attacks on UNPROFOR personnel and calls upon the Bosnian parties to extend earlier cease fire agreement beyond 30 April 1995.
- Resolution 988 21 April 1995
Suspends trade restrictions and other measures referred to in Resolution 943 until 5 July 1995. Expresses concern about reported helicopter sorties.
- Resolution 990 28 April 1995
Authorizes the deployment of UNCRO as described in Secretary-General's report of 18 April 1995, and calls upon the Croatian government and local Serb authorities to fully comply.
- Resolution 994 17 May 1995
Demands respect for mandate of UNCRO and the withdrawal of troops from Zone of Separation in Sector West. Demands that the Croatian government respect the rights of the Serb population.
- Resolution 998 15 June 1995
Demands that Bosnian Serbs release all detained persons immediately and unconditionally, calls upon parties to respect the safety of UNPROFOR personnel, allow unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and respect the Status of the Safe Areas. Welcomes the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia to enable the UN Peace Forces (UNPF) UNPROFOR to carry out the mandate. Authorizes increase in UNPF/UNPROFOR strength by up to 12,500.

- Resolution 1004 12 July 1995
 Demands that the Bosnian Serbs cease their offensive and withdraw from Srebrenica. Demands the unconditional release of all detained UNPROFOR personnel. Demands that all parties allow unimpeded access for UNHCR and other aid agencies. Requests Secretary-General to use all resources to restore Safe Area status of Srebrenica.
- Resolution 1009 10 August 1995
 Deplores Croatia's Operation Storm offensive launched on 4 August 1995 in Sectors North and South, and demands that Croatia immediately ceases all military actions in compliance with Resolution 994. Demands also that the Croatian government fully respect the human rights of local Serb population. Urges parties to restrain from actions in Sector East.
- Resolution 1010 10 August 1995
 Expresses deep concern about reported grave violations of international humanitarian law in connection with the Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa, demands that Bosnian Serb forces grant immediate access to international humanitarian organizations and urges the release of all detainees.
- Resolution 1016 21 September 1995
 Notes assurances of Croatian and Bosnian governments regarding offensive actions in western Bosnia. Deplores casualties suffered by Danish peace keepers.
- Resolution 1019 9 November 1995
 Demands that Bosnian Serbs grant humanitarian organizations access to persons displaced and detained or reported missing from Srebrenica, Zepa and the regions of Sanski Most and Banja Luka. Demands that Bosnian Serbs respect fully the rights of such persons, ensure their safety and release them immediately as well as allowing complete movement of personnel of UN and relevant international organizations.
- Resolution 1021 22 November 1995
 Following the report of the Secretary General, maintains the arms embargo for 90 days. During the second 90 day period, all provisions of the embargo shall be terminated, except the delivery of heavy weapons (as defined in the Dayton peace agreement). After the 108th day following the submission of the Security Council

report, all provisions of the arms embargo are to be terminated, unless the Security council deems otherwise.

- Resolution 1022 22 November 1995
Suspends immediately and indefinitely sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia subsequent to its signing of the Dayton peace agreement. The suspension does not apply to the Bosnian Serb entity until the day after the Commander of the envisaged implementation force informs the Security Council that all Bosnian Serb troops have withdrawn behind the Zones of Separation, as provided in the Dayton peace agreement.
- Resolution 1023 22 November 1995
Welcomes the Basic Agreement of the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, and recognizes the request to establish a Transitional Authority and authorize an appropriate international force.
- Resolution 1025 30 November 1995
Decides to terminate the UNCRO mandate after an interim period ending on 15 January 1996, when the Security Council has decided on the deployment (including necessary transfer of authority) of the transitional peacekeeping force.
- Resolution 1026 30 November 1995
Extends UNPROFOR mandate for a period terminating on 31 January 1996, pending further action by the Security Council regarding the Peace Agreement. Invites the Secretary General to submit reports containing the necessary information and recommendations on aspects of the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement.
- Resolution 1027 30 November 1995
Extends UNPREDEP mandate until 30 May 1996 and urges UNPREDEP to continue its cooperation with the Security Council. Calls upon member states to assist UNPREDEP in the performance of its mandate.

APPENDIX B

KEY PEOPLE IN THE BALKAN CONFLICT

United Nations:

Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar	
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali	Jan. 92
Mr. Cyrus Vance, UNSG Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia	Nov. 91
Mr. Yasushi Akashi, UN SRSG for Yugoslavia	Dec. 93
UN Under Secretary for PK Kofi Annan (takes place of Akashi)	Oct. 95

European Community:

Lord Carrington (UK)	
Lord Owen (UK)	Aug 92
PM Carl Bildt (DM)	Jun 95

UNPROFOR Force Commanders:

MG Lewis Mackenzie (CA)	Jun 92
Lt. Gen. Lars-Eric Wahlgren (SW)	Mar 93
Gen. Jean Cot (FR)	Jul 93
Lt. Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle (FR)	Mar 94
Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier (FR)	Mar 95

UNPROFOR Bosnia Commanders:

Lt. Gen. Philippe Mordlon (FR)	Dec 92
Lt. Gen. Francois Briquemont (BE)	Jul 93
Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose (UK)	Jan 94
Lt. Gen. Rurpert Smith (UK)	Jan 95

NATO Commanders:

Gen. John Shalikashvili, USA, SACEUR	
Gen. George Joulwan, USA, SACEUR	
ADM Jeremy Boorda, USN, CINCSOUTH	
ADM Leighton Smith, USN, CINCSOUTH	Apr 94
VADM Thomas Lopez, USN, COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH	
VADM Joseph Prueher, USN, COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH	Dec 93
VADM Donald Pilling, USN, COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH	Apr 95
Lt. Gen. Ashley, USAF COMAIRSOUTH	
Lt. Gen. Ryan, USAF COMAIRSOUTH	

APPENDIX C

KEY EVENTS MAY - OCTOBER 1995

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| May | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- UNSCR demands Croatia withdraw from Sector West (ignored)- Krajina Serbs fire missiles on Zagreb- Bosnian Serbs (BSA) shell Sarajevo- UNPROFOR Sarajevo issues ultimatum to BSA- BSA Fails to respond - NATO launches air strikes- BSA shell kills civilians in Tuzla- NATO responds against BSA targets near Pale- BSA takes over 300 UN "hostages"- Bosnian Serbs renounce all agreements with the UN |
| June | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- President Chirac takes office in France- France decides to reinforce Sarajevo- UN authorizes British, French, Dutch RRF (UNSCR 998)- Bosnian Government breaks all contact with Mr. Akashi |
| July | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- BSA forces take Srebrenica safe area, commit atrocities- UNSCR 1004 demands BSA withdrawal (ignored)- BSA forces take Zepa safe area- US/UK/French ultimatum to BSA regarding Gorazde- Combined Croatian/BIH ground offensive in Western Bosnia- US Senate votes to lift arms embargo on Bosnia |
| August | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- NATO threatens BSA with air strikes if remaining safe areas attacked- Croatia launches Operation Storm, quickly retakes UNPA sectors North and South- UNSCR 1009 deplores Operation Storm- BSA shells kill civilians in Sarajevo market- UN 'Dual Key' authority delegated to UNPROFOR in Zagreb- NATO attacks on BSA C4I & IAD nodes coordinated with RRF attacks on BSA positions on Mt. Igman (Operation Deliberate Force)- Pause in NATO/RRF attacks |
| September | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- UNPROFOR Zagreb issues written demands to BSA- BSA fails to comply- NATO resumes widespread air strikes on BSA C4I, IAD and logistics/ ammo storage sites. Includes first use of ship launched Cruise Missiles.- Foreign Ministers meet in Geneva - agree Bosnia to remain a single state.- BIH/Croatian ground offensive intensifies and threatens BSA stronghold at Banja Luka. |

- US brokers pause in NATO air strikes
- BSA removes heavy weapons from Sarajevo Safe Area and Sarajevo airport reopened.
- NATO suspends air strikes.
- UNSCR 1016 regarding BIH/Croatian offensive in West Bosnia

October

- President Clinton announces cease fire to take effect 10 October
- Mr. Akashi relieved
- US intensifies shuttled diplomacy